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Abstract
By returning to the foundational principles of
second-order cybernetics and resting on the central
role of the observer, this essay explores how the
distinction between data/information can be
conceptualized. Using systems theory, we derive a
series of systemic principles for the distinction
between data/information and we illustrate them with
a case study from Anti-Money Laundering.

1. Introduction
At the very heart of the field of Information
Systems (IS) lies the concept of information.
However, despite the critical importance of this
concept along with the concept of the system, IS
scholars have not really engaged with the combined
theoretical challenge of exploring both. Approaching
this topic systemically can allow us to delve deeper
into the character of both data and information. We say
both because systemically, as we shall see, it is not
possible to ‘define’ one without referring to the other.
This essay joins the call of several scholars that have
stressed the need to investigate information further [8,
21]. Boell for example [3:3] stresses the need to
develop frameworks that can “help IS researchers,
practitioners, and students when they seek general
orientation into how information can be
conceptualized”. Taking a step towards such a
framework, we develop theoretical propositions from
the body of systems theory, in the tradition of secondorder cybernetics [2, 9, 16]; our goal is to reflect on
the distinction between data/information through
systems theory, in the context of an observer-relative
approach. The essay is structured as follows.
The second section of this essay reviews in brief
the main ‘camps’ of information. The third section
delineates the key systems theoretical concepts and
develops the relevant propositions. In the fourth
section of the paper, the propositions are illustrated
and applied through a sample case on anti-money
laundering. The final section offers brief conclusions.

2. Related work
While there is no consensus or strict definition of
information (or of an information system for that
matter), we often tend to think of data as having some
type of relation with the concept of information.
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In tracing the different strands of information
perspectives, Boell [3:10] provides a very useful
classification and delineates four main stances on
information at an ontological level: a) the physical
stance where the existence of information can be
conceived as independent of a human observer and is
part of the physical world, b) the objective stance
where information is observer-independent in the
sense of true facts or physical inscriptions of
knowledge, c) the subject-centred stance where
information exists as cognitive process resulting from
an observation, d) the sociocultural stance where
information exists as shared
sociocultural
understanding of the importance of differences.
Mingers and Standing [22:18] also identify the two
main camps of information as objective (and
independent of the receiver) and information as
subjective (constructed by the receiver). While these
categorizations are useful and we would like to
position our essay in the subject-centered stance due
to the primacy we shall place to the concept of the
observer, we must stress that any categorization is in
itself a product of observation that then abstracts the
observer away [1]. In this regard, the concept of
information is possibly one of the most challenging
ones due to the level of abstraction that one has to
attain for its description. For this reason, we develop
the discussion starting from fundamental principles
that relate to the function of an observer. We stress
again that we’re not trying to define data or
information uniquely. This means that, from within the
context of our analysis, neither information nor data
can be ‘defined’ as standalone entities. They need each
other, a boundary between them, and an observer.
In order to facilitate the discussion that follows, we
will be extracting a set of theoretical propositions
(designated as P1, P2, P3, … Pn) through the application
of systems concepts. Thus, the development of these
principles has been weaved in together with the
theoretical review.

3. Information through theories of
distinction
Imagine a void (if that is physically possible) or more
simply, a blank sheet of paper. Then draw a
distinction. This could be a circle, or a mark like the
one that Spencer-Brown [26] uses in his algebra:
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Figure 1. The form of the distinction
What happens to that void or blank space once a
distinction has been drawn? In basic terms, we can say
that the space has been severed and two distinct spaces
can be recognized: a marked space (e.g. within the
circle) that represents the ‘inside’ and an unmarked
space that represents the ‘outside’ (e.g. external to the
circle). This is the starting place that we take,
following George Spencer-Brown [26] who builds on
the concept of distinction as the fundamental starting
point of any act of observing. Luhmann also places a
paramount significance onto the primacy of distinction
in relation to observation. For this issue he remarks
that “the world is observable because it is
unobservable. Nothing can be observed (not even the
‘nothing’) without drawing a distinction…” [17:87].
Everything else that follows in this essay, stems
from this fundamental starting point through which all
the rest unfold: we “take as given the idea of
distinction and the idea of indication” [26:1]; we
cannot make an indication without drawing a
distinction. In other words, distinction is the starting
point of all analysis, through which, “once a
distinction is drawn, the space, states, or contents on
each side of the boundary, being distinct, can be
indicated” [26:1]. Put differently and as established by
Spencer-Brown [26:ix], any indication implies duality
in the sense that we cannot produce a thing without
coproducing what it is not. In turn, this duality implies
a “triplicity: what the thing is, what it isn’t and the
boundary between them”. Or else, “you cannot
indicate anything without defining two states, and you
cannot define two states without creating three
elements” (p.ix). The primacy of the distinction is
fundamental, as is the role of the observer in defining
a state. Following Spencer-Brown then, a number of
questions are raised if we take the concept of
‘information’: what is information? What isn’t
information? What is the boundary between these two
states?
The moment we draw a distinction, we indicate two
distinct sides (a marked/observed side, and an
unmarked/unobserved side). A convention in systems
theory has become to call the space created inside the
distinction the system and the side outside of it, the
environment. Between the two, one can find the
boundary. Then, the central paradigm under which we
inform our systems theoretical analysis is neither the
system, nor the environment, but the “relationship
between system and environment” [16:176] (emphasis
added). Thus, in our context, it is neither data, nor
information, but the relationship between data and

information. It is important to emphasize that “the
concept of the environment in relation to that of the
system, should not be misunderstood as a kind of
residual category. Instead, relationship to the
environment is constitutive in system formation…the
point from which all further investigations in systems
theory must begin is therefore not identity but
difference…the system is neither ontologically nor
analytically more important than the environment;
both, are what they are only in reference to each other”
[16:176–177]. Thus, we reach a first important
principle that is general in systems theory:
P1: We can only observe by drawing a distinction that
indicates two sides (e.g. system/environment) and
both are what they are only in reference to each other.
So when we are considering the application of P1 to
information and what information is not, we need to
recognize that neither data nor information can ever
be defined uniquely (this applies to all words as
language itself is a self-referential structure where
each word is ‘defined’ by others, ad infinitum as noted
by Korzybski [15]). Furthermore, strict definitions of
either data or information will fail as any effort to
define them would equate to the creation of an
“isolated ontology”; this is an impossibility based on
P1. However, data and information can be approached
relationally and considered as sides of a
marked/unmarked space (e.g. system/environment).
Thus, the task at hand is to place these two concepts
(data and information) on the sides indicated by a
primary distinction like system/environment.
So how should we start to explore the relationship
between data and information? At this stage, two
options present themselves if we were to start with
data. The first option is to consider data as part of the
system; the second option is to consider data as part of
a system’s environment. However, in the context of
taking an observer-sensitive approach, we posit that
data can only be considered as part of the environment.
This may be taken as an axiomatic position on our side
but there is a logic behind this decision: once we
consider the primary distinction to be that between
system/environment and the elements that need to be
placed on either side to be data and information, then
we have the following combinatory possibilities.
# System
(marked space)

Environment

Distinction

(unmarked space)

1 Information
2 Data
3 Information

Data
Information
Information

4 Data

Data

information/data
data/information
information/
information
data/data
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Table 1: Elemental distinctions of data & information
We shall illustrate our preference for option one by
using reductio ad absurdum for the remaining options
(a reminder here that this does not only mean that we
eliminate absurd propositions but also those that are
impractical or irrelevant in a specific context). Thus,
the starting point of the application of reductio ad
absurdum for us, is the context of an observer-relative
analysis. We focus on the impracticality of the
remaining options.
The fourth option (#4) whereby we have data both
in the system and in the environment does not concern
us as no observer is participating in the interactions
between the system and its environment. If an observer
internalized data then we would have information. But
in option #4, we have both the marked and unmarked
spaces containing identical elements (data/data); this
essentially reflects a data processing system where
there is no interference of a cognitive entity (i.e. a
human being). As we will see in a moment, we
consider that to be an essential part of using the
concept of ‘information’ as part of any distinction.
The
third
option
(#3)
between
information/information requires two distinct
observers (one in the system and another one at the
environment of that system). This would imply that the
observer in the system receives the information that
was communicated by the observer in the
environment. Furthermore, this would demand perfect
communication between these two cognitive
observers. This is an impossibility. As Luhmann notes
in a much discussed quotation: “humans cannot
communicate; not even their brains can communicate;
not even their conscious minds can communicate; only
communication can communicate” [16:71]. Whatever
is being communicated from one observer to another,
it cannot be the information that exists in the cognitive
state of an observer. Information in an observer’s
cognitive state would need to be depicted in a
notational schema (e.g. language, mathematics, etc)
before being announced/uttered. The very act of
depicting a cognitive state of an observer into a form
that can be communicable, reduces its complexity [1].
In that sense, information is the observerrelative/cognitive state that exists prior to
communication. When an observer seeks to impart
information then he/she needs to reduce its complexity
so that it can become part of a semantic space and then
a communications channel. This necessary
complexity-reduction (of information that an observer
wishes to communicate) is required so that
information can be uttered; more critically, when this
happens, information collapses into a state of being
pre-observed (or waiting to be observed) and could

thus be classified as data (instead of information). In
this sense, we cannot have information without
redundancy [14]. As Luhmann frames it: “Information
is the surprise value of news, given a limited or
unlimited number of other possibilities. Redundancy
follows (in a circular fashion) from the fact that
information is used when autopoietic systems operate.
An operation reduces the selection potential from
other contributions. A sentence, for instance, reduces
the scope of contributions that fit into it” [19:33].
Thus, in the process of dismissing #3 for our primary
distinction, we are led to pose a rather counterintuitive
proposition, but one that is in line with the preceding
discussion in an observer-relative context:
P2: Information cannot be communicated (not
without suffering a necessary reduction in its
complexity); it is observer-sensitive.
Of particular interest is our last remaining option (#2
where we have data in the system, information in the
environment). This distinction however is meaningful
if and only if there is an observer in the environment.
For such an observer, without any loss of generality,
we could assert that they – from their own observing
perspective – would consider information inside their
own marked space (their system). In this regard, this
reversal would end up in the same form with option
#1. Thus, option #2 would coincide with option #1 in
the context of an observer-relative system. All options
considered, we are left with option #1 where we retain
information inside the system and data in the
environment of that (observing) system. In brief,
whatever data is, it can be found in an unmarked and
unobserved state where the observer does not observe.
P3: Data is always in the environment of a system and
part of an unobserved/unmarked space. It becomes
information once the space on the ‘inside’ of the
distinction between system/environment (i.e. the
observing system) internalizes data.
In this context and using Spencer-Brown’s notation,
an information system could be represented in the
following way (Figure 2) and defined as follows: An
information system is a demarcated state, a space
where an observer-relative transformation occurs and
data crosses a systemic boundary to become
information. This requires a cognitive observer.
Alternatively, it would have required a mechanism
capable of spontaneously creating distinctions through
which this transformation can be realized (e.g. some
future artificial intelligence).
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Figure 2. An observer-relative information system
There are two consequences to the above definition
and the primary distinction between information/data.
First, the centrality of the concept of the observer in
indicating the two sides is fundamental; information is
entangled with the observer. From this perspective, we
cannot have information without observers, only data.
Second, the indication created by the distinction
between system/environment as information/data,
highlights an important role for the boundary. The
boundary is ontologically neither part of the system
nor of the environment [18]. It is part of both. Through
the boundary, the transmutation of data to information
becomes possible. Through the boundary, the
multiplicity of informational potentialities that exist in
data is selectively internalized by the observer. We
define the concept of information potentiality to be a
characteristic of data prior to systemic (and thus
observer-sensitive) internalization. Or else, if we
consider the exact same data entity to be observed by
different observers then each of these observers would
generate different information; such variation in
information will emerge from the interaction of the
observer with the data. Thus, data entails a multiplicity
of information potentials and these are selectively
reduced by an observer that will allow for the
emergence of information.
P4: Data entails a multiplicity of information
potentialities which are selectively reduced by an
observer.
In this context, the boundary between the system and
the environment (ultimately in our context the
boundary between information and data) plays an
important role in shaping the mode with which data
becomes internalized. Though it would take another
paper altogether to explore in-depth the boundary
conditions that shape the transmutation of data to
information and vice-versa, it is important to
emphasize that it is the (observing) system that
‘controls’ the sensitivity of the boundary [16], thereby
affecting the dynamics between itself as an
information system VS its data environment. Let us
explore these aspects (the centrality of the observer in
information and the role of the boundary) a bit closer.
First, as we have already noted based on P1, the
function of the observer is to create a distinction to
begin with. Without the concept of the observer, the
distinction would not have been possible. Thus, the
form of the distinction is only in the eye of the

observer. One example here comes from Heinz von
Foerster who describes a piece of paper with
letters/symbols on it. We can think of this as ‘data’;
they are in a sense, some symbols in a piece of paper.
Foerster then argues that only when you (i.e. the
observer) look at the paper, you generate the
information. As he put it: “information is generated in
the one who looks at things” [11]. Of course, this
condition presupposes a cognitive observer that can
create a distinction through which the indication
between information/data becomes possible. The
crossing from the unmarked state to the marked state
places the relationship between information/data
within the remit of an observer. In addition, this affects
how data can be defined relationally through both: a)
the concept of the observer, and, b) the concept of
information. These aspects lead us to establish the
following:
P5: Information presupposes the existence of an
observing system (i.e. a system capable of creating
distinctions spontaneously); data is what exists before
observing.
In other words, the observer plays the most pivotal role
in a sequence of fundamental operations. These are
interlinked with how any space becomes
marked/unmarked and how the distinction between
information/data can be conceptualized. For a firstorder observer that is engaged in the act of observing,
we have the substitution of the subject/object
paradigm to the triplicity mentioned before. Thus, we
have an observing system, a boundary, and an
environment. Applied to the distinction between
information/data we have: an observing information
system, a boundary (whereby feedback processes
between information/data exchanges take place and
the information system enables the transformation
from data to information), and of course, an
environment of data.

Figure 3. Observer-guided information/data systemic
differentiation
A second-order observer, who can act as an ‘observer
of observers’ may subsume the distinction above into
his/her own marked space, but not without creating yet
another unmarked space [19]. However, regardless of
the level we’re looking at observation, for any given
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observing system, the environment is always more
complex but that does not mean that the environment
has no structure [16]. Indeed, observers exist in the
environment as well. In both cases, the form of the
distinction (system/environment) remains the same as
another observer in the environment would create
another distinction that would have the same
system/environment form. This has implications for
information/data. As each of them creates unique
system/environment (and thus information/data)
differentiations, then
P6: The observer-relative nature of distinctionmaking implies relational conditions; coupled with
the idea that the environment has structure, data can
be data for one observing system (if it remains at its
environment) and information for another observing
system (if that system internalizes such information).
Once again, from a different relational angle we come
to the position that there is no information without an
observer. Here, we must make a clarification. While
an obvious observing system would be a human
observer, an organization can also be considered to be
an observing system since every organization observes
itself and its environment and based on these
observations, it reproduces itself [24]. Of course, the
latter does not involve cognition. Also, we leave open
the potential of a future artificial intelligence as
another observing system capable of enabling the
transformation illustrated in Figure 2.
Furthermore, the role of the boundary between any
system and its environment is critical. While the
separation between system/environment is a starting
assumption in systems theory and a primary
distinction, we’ve already mentioned how it demands
a triplicity and a boundary between the two. Of course,
“a system boundary never just is, ontologically, but is
always coming into being as part and parcel of the
system’s total ontogenesis, or as this will come to be
called, autopoiesis.” [4:98]. As systemic ontogenesis
(i.e. the act of a system coming into being) is observerdependent and observer-relative, the role of the
boundary in the distinction between information/data
is ‘controlled’ by the observer. The observing
information system makes (poies) itself (autopoiesis),
it identifies itself as an information system, by
establishing a boundary between itself and its
environment. It uses its environment (i.e. data) in order
to maintain and organize itself (self-organization). By
the concept of a self-organizing system we mean “a
system that eats energy and order from its
environment” so that it can increase its own internal
order [9:8]. In that way, in the short term, the system
can (attempt to) become negentropic. Negative

entropy (negentropy) is perceived as contrary to
entropy - the thermodynamic principle that systems
run down to ultimate disorder or death. A good
example to reflect on these conditions comes from
evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr who describes that
this is what every member of every species on the
planet does, humans of course, included. As
(biological) systems, we exploit the resources of our
environment (natural resources) in order to avoid
temporarily our natural tendency towards maximum
entropy. For instance, if you stop eating and drinking,
it won’t be very long before yourself (as a biological
system) is driven to its maximum state of entropy (i.e.
death). But even though that state of maximum
entropy is unavoidable in the long-run, in the shortterm we are able to survive and flourish. We do that
by consuming energy from our environment and so
our system (the organism) becomes negentropic in the
short-term by exploiting these resources from its
environment [20]. It is through a similar mechanism
that information systems develop an autopoietic
character: they consume data from their systemic
environment and through such consumption, they
maintain themselves. Applied to an information
system:
P7: Information systems support themselves in the
autopoietic sense by consuming data (equivalent to a
source of energy) from their environment. They do so
in order to become negentropic in the short run.
While this negentropic pursuit remains a general goal
orientation for any system that seeks to survive its
(more complex and demanding) environment, it also
raises further questions as to how this is achieved,
pursued, or even structurally configured by the system.
With the fear of stating the obvious, the richness of the
IS literature in dissecting IS failures, illustrates that
information systems can also be swayed towards a
state of maximum entropy and an information ‘death’.
This depends on how the (information) system enables
the transformation of (part of) its data environment
into a reduced, and thus, more manageable stream of
information potentialities, before the users/observers
internalize those as information. Building on the work
of von Foerster [9] who addressed the connection
between the system and the order it can consume from
its environment, the following question can be raised:
how much informational order can a system assimilate
from its data environment, if any at all? While the
quantitative rendition of this problem through the
concept of entropy was introduced by Shannon to
indicate the capacity of information transmission in a
communication channel, it is important to remember
here that Shannon’s constructs relate to
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communication from an engineering perspective.
Strictly speaking, these relate to ‘data’ and not
‘information’; this is because meaning does not, and
of course, cannot enter the equations. To add to the
confusion, Shannon’s theory developed in the
“Mathematical theory of communication” [25] is
widely referred to as ‘information theory’. However,
as documented by Heylighen & Joslyn, “while
Shannon came to disavow the use of the term
‘information’ to describe this measure, because it is
purely syntactic and ignores the meaning of the signal,
his theory came to be known as Information Theory
nonetheless” [13:7].
In this regard, we must state clearly that the
conceptual basis of the IS field, as it has evolved by
recognizing an interaction between the technical and
the social, and a role for human agency (however
limited on occasion), cannot have a theory of signal
transmissions as its foundational basis, one that is
absent of ‘meaning’ and ‘observer’ considerations.
Ultimately, the communication channel (a la
Shannon) is a carrier for signals, data alone; such data
enables a multiplicity of information-potentialities to
be extracted by different observers. In other words, the
observer internalizes and activates a particular
selection of data that will cross over from the
environment so that the emergence of information can
surface. In this manner, we view the informationpotential that can be extracted from data, not as an
objective property that characterizes data itself. It is
dependent on different observers. Different observers
will assimilate a different ‘order’. Also, strictly
speaking, the information is not generated in the
human observer from data alone (in a one-to-one
correspondence relationship). Information emerges in
the cognitive observer when the observer relates the
transformation of data to information and connects the
latter with already existing knowledge.

4. An illustration of principles with
Demetis’ case study on Bank X on
Anti-Money Laundering
In this section, we use a case study presented by
Demetis [7] at Decision Support Systems about the
role of technology in fighting money laundering in
order to illustrate the principles presented in the
previous section. While the analysis here does not
substitute the in-depth case study, it gives us the
opportunity to illustrate how the principles can be
considered in an organizational context. Before doing
so, we describe the institutional context in brief.
Banks (and several other reporting institutions like
insurance companies, casinos, etc) are obliged to
monitor transactions for potential money laundering

(ML) behavior. When they think they’ve spotted
suspicious behavior they have to file a Suspicious
Activity Report (also known as a SAR) with the
authorities who are tasked to investigate further and
forward such cases for prosecution if there’s enough
evidence. The banks use a variety of data for
establishing suspicion but the starting point is always
raw transaction data. These are filtered through
transaction monitoring systems that apply a variety of
algorithmic queries in order to flag suspects. Members
of staff would then evaluate such technology-oriented
flags manually and would escalate the issue internally
to the Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO).
In turn, the MLRO would submit these reports to a
national authority, known as the Financial Intelligence
Unit (FIU) that analyses all reports and may forward
the cases further for prosecution. In the case-study
itself, Demetis presents a series of internal, external
and self-referential structural couplings in the context
of AML and Bank X [7:101]. We will use those in the
examples
and
analysis
provided
below.

4.1. P1: Observing by drawing a
distinction
Based on this principle, an observing system draws a
distinction that indicates two sides (e.g.
system/environment) and both are what they are only
in reference to each other. Each observing system
draws its own distinctions. In the example case of
AML, the primary distinction that is being used is
between the bank as a system and its environment (the
environment here includes law enforcement, other
banks, the financial intelligence unit, prosecution
authorities, media, etc) however a number of
subsystems in the bank are also analyzed. Informed by
the case study of the bank, we can distinguish three
different forms of observing systems: i) the entire bank
as an observing system (the whole of the system) that
distinguishes itself from its environment, ii) a
department within the bank like the AML department
or the marketing department (i.e. an observing
(sub)system within the system) that distinguishes itself
from both its internal environment (i.e. the other
subsystems) and its external environment, and
ultimately, iii) human beings (e.g. a member of staff in
the AML department) as the cognitive observing
systems that can enable the transformation of data to
information. Thus, we can distinguish three different
observing systems from the AML case study that
relate to the financial institution.
Two more general types of observing systems that
can be distinguished from the case: i) an observing
system that is set up to receive data from its
environment and, ii) a cognitive observing system (i.e.
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a human agent) that is capable of the actual
transformation from data to information We use the
accepted Unicode symbol [12] for the observer (o) to
mean the following sentence: ‘from the perspective of
the observing system of the…’. For example, the
phrase “from the perspective of the observing system
of the bank” can be written as “o bank”. We use this
to indicate an observing system in general and the
combination “o human” would represent a cognitive
human observer.

4.2. P2: Information cannot be
communicated; not without suffering a
complexity-reduction
Unlike data, information is not a commodity which
can be passed on from one observing system to another
without any meaning modification, re-interpretation,
or adjustment. No two observers can conceive of
exactly the same thing as that would lead to a paradox
of their identity. Furthermore, the “newness” [2] that
any given information comes to bear on an observer is
not an objective property of information. The
emergence of information is itself contingent on the
observing system wherein information emerges. In
brief, if we take the observer into account then
information
cannot
be
communicated.
In the case study of the bank, Demetis [4:103]
describes several mechanisms with which members of
staff, ML analysts in particular, generate information
about customer suspicious behavior by internalizing
data. Based on P2, this information emerges within the
observer and cannot be communicated as is. An
illustrative scenario is when a ML employee
internalizes data from flagged ‘suspect’ transactions
by using the transaction monitoring system. The case
study describes a series of factors like staff experience,
training, perceptions about transacting & lifestyle
behavior of suspect, and other behavioral
characteristics that affect the communication of
suspicion by the ML analyst. In this specific case, as
the true positive rate of the software (the rate at which
ML cases generated by the software were confirmed
as true suspicions once members of staff scrutinized
them) was very low at first (starting at ~1%), high
levels of staff demotivation also became an important
consideration, with staff becoming wary of
scrutinizing transactions carefully. From the case, it
becomes evident that a large number of characteristics
affect how ML staff come to decide about whether a
customer is suspect or not. These are not only their
interpretations of customer behavior and transacting,
but also personal, behavioral, psychological aspects of
the staff themselves (their training, experiences, cases
they’ve handled previously, etc). Ultimately, many

different observer-relative elements converge into
shaping the boundary between data and information.
This deep nexus of observer-sensitive characteristics
that have meaning for an observer and influence the
process of information emergence, must face a
necessary reduction in complexity if they are to be
communicated. Without such a reduction, the observer
would not have been able to depict what he/she
perceives as information into a notational schema (in
this case-example, ML staff submit an internal report
to the MLRO, describing why a customer is suspected
of money laundering). Of course, by default, the very
use of a notational schema (like language), reduces the
level and complexity of communication itself (a
necessary prerequisite for its structuring). Ultimately,
o human analyst, information is reduced to data that
can be communicable, and o MLRO, such data is
internalized as information based on another
ecosystem of his/her own observer-sensitive
characteristics and additional considerations. In the
narrative of the case, Demetis describes an instance
where o MLRO, all the ‘suspicious cases’ that were
communicated by members of staff to the MLRO,
were passed on to the Financial Intelligence Unit of
the country, as the MLRO felt that there was no way
of knowing whether in a national context the case
could be suspicious (o MLRO, the data o human
analysts were internalized as information by
considering characteristics external to the system). In
turn, o FIU who became inundated with SARs, this
became data at the environment of their own system
that would be internalized based on organizational and
individual/analyst conditions, requirements, decision
making processes, and so on. But at any given stage,
what is actually communicated is not information, not
in the way this was generated within a human
observing system within the cognition of the observer;
what is communicated is a collapsed and simplified
form of the observer-sensitive information. This then
becomes part of a communication channel, to be then
perceived as data at the environment of another
observer before being re-internalized as information.
While we admit that P2 is counterintuitive, this is
actually in agreement with Shannon’s work [25]
whereby the social context, the human element, and
indeed, the concept of the observer do not come into
the picture (in fact, the word ‘observer’ is featured just
twice in Shannon’s work to indicate an “auxiliary
device” that “notes the errors in the recovered message
and transmits data to the receiving point”); not a
human agent as we would include that agent in IS
research.

4.3. P3: Data is always in the environment
of a system
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As we’ve noted in section 4.1., we have different
levels of observing systems. However, regardless of
what observing system perspective we may take, P3
applies. We will look into this by following a
sequence of how data becomes internalized from the
system (the bank), the subsystem (the AML
department), and the ML-analyst (the cognitive
observing system), before being evaluated from the
Money Laundering Reporting Officer (the MLRO)
and sent to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) at
national level. The sequence is: Bank à AML Dept.,
à ML-analyst à MLRO à FIU. So, o bank, data
is at its external environment as raw transaction data.
In turn, o AML department (as a subsystem),
according to the case study of Bank X, a subset of
raw transaction data commensurate with MLprofiling practices would be the data at its
environment. These enter first the boundary of the
bank as raw transaction data and then are reduced in
complexity by the transaction monitoring system of
the bank. The output of the transaction monitoring
system of the bank would in turn be internalized by
money laundering analysts. As the cognitive
observing systems, the ML-analysts have to decide
whether a transaction is suspicious enough to be
explored further, or not. Thus, o human analyst,
data at his/her environment includes the transactions
that have been flagged by the software as potentially
high-risk (as well as the raw transaction data that are
at the environment of the bank as a system’s
environment is also a subsystem’s environment). The
human analyst would internalize such data and
generate information that is observer-relative. In
internalizing such data, the ML analyst connects it as
an element to a nexus of other elements in his/her
experience and previous knowledge. From this
process, the human analyst generates information on
whether the potential suspect for ML is truly suspect
(again o human analyst) or not. However, once the
human analyst generates this information, P2 applies
(where information cannot be communicated without
a necessary reduction in its complexity). Based on the
case example, the assessment o human analyst will
be depicted in an internal report (an internal
Suspicious Activity Report), and this will become
new data, at the environment of other observing
systems. In this case, the observing system is the
Money Laundering Reporting Officer who is at the
board of directors and responsible for the bank’s
compliance. In turn, o MLRO the data at the internal
suspicious activity report need to be internalized by
him/her so that another decision can be made. This
re-activates the main distinction encapsulated within
the internal activity report (between suspicious/nonsuspicious customer) and the MLRO may decide to

reinforce one part to the distinction (e.g. suspicion) or
dismiss it. In turn, when the MLRO submits a
Suspicious Activity Report to the FIU that is an
intelligence agency at a national level, o national
authority, this is data again that has to be internalized
and evaluated. Ultimately, as the primary distinction
between any given system and its environment is
relational and dependent on the observing perspective
of a system, data is always at the environment of a
system. How it becomes information is contingent on
a series of interactions and boundary conditions and
is down to individual cognitive observers and how
they communicate.

4.4. P4: Data entails a multiplicity of
information potentialities
As we’ve noted, the bank itself is set up in order to
receive a specific kind of data from its environment;
in this case study, o bank, this is financial
transaction data from its customers (while there are
other data in the environment of the bank like media
and social networking services). In transacting with
the bank, the customers essentially create the data
that will cross the systemic boundary of the bank and
find its way into the bank’s databases. This is where
different information potentialities can be realized
and redirected to different observing systems (before
they are internalized as information by members of
staff). From the case study of the bank that discusses
how money laundering is profiled from different
sources, we find examples of marketing and fraud
related data that are used for money laundering
profiling, while other data from the environment like
enquiries from law enforcement agencies are also
used. Here, the multiplicity of information
potentialities that data holds is expressed in two ways
in the bank. First, a more general observation is that
the exact same data from the environment (i.e. raw
transactions by customers) is used by different
departments of the bank; in that way, transaction data
are selectively reduced to different information
potentialities. For example, the same (raw
transaction) data can be used to: a) profile money
laundering o AML subsystem, b) market new
products or services like pre-paid cards, loans, etc,
o marketing subsystem, c) find new sales
opportunities o sales subsystem, d) monitor fraud
related activity o anti-fraud subsystem, e) assess
human resources required to handle new lines of
business based on volumes of transacting and
customer preferences o HR subsystem, and many
more. Data itself holds a multiplicity of information
potentialities depending on what observing system
will attempt its internalization. However, it only
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becomes information when a cognitive observer
internalizes this data and generates the information
that has meaning for that particular observer.
Quite often, as Demetis points out in the case
study, the organizational structure and the hard
divisions between departments will make it difficult
for some observing subsystems within the bank to
realize this multiplicity of information potentialities.
We would argue that this is because they
misconceive what they have as ‘information’ that has
already been internalized for the purpose of the
subsystem, instead of ‘data’ that holds a multiplicity
of (external to the observing system) informationpotentialities. An example comes from the AML
department that wanted to enable its members of staff
to generate information (and thus, internalize it for
their own purposes, meaning, and subsequent
decision making) regarding suspicious behavior for
ML from demographics data used in the marketing
department. This data was originally only used for strictly - marketing purposes by marketing staff.
Initially, when AML staff approached marketing staff
with the idea of using marketing data for money
laundering investigations, this did not register at all
with the latter as they could not see the potential at
all. This was until AML staff asked marketing staff:
“How would you market a product to a money
launderer?” [7:100] This illustrates further that for
any given human observing system within a
subsystem (say members of staff within the AML
department), data at its own environment entails
further information potentialities even if it has been
internalized by another observing subsystem. There is
no limit to how this can be realized as the
system/environment distinction is replicated
internally within the system and can be realized as
the distinction between information/data across
different levels. One can draw parallels here with
John Searle’s work with computation that must be
observer-relative and that the one and the same
process can be interpreted as different computations
by different observers, a principle that he calls
multiple realizability [23].

4.5 & P5: Information presupposes the
existence of an observing system; data
is what exists before observing
These two principles are complementary and express
the primacy of the observer in relation to information.
For data to exist, some observing system has created
it. For instance, in our example, the ML-analyst
creates an internal-SAR that is submitted to the
MLRO. The ML-analyst uses data to generate
information about the suspect and then communicates

that as data in the form of the internal-SAR (that will
in turn be internalized as information o MLRO).
Thus, if we take the internal-SAR as the data being
communicated o analyst to o MLRO, then data is a
duality of both post-observed information (o MLanalyst who created it) and pre-observed information
(o future consumer of it that will internalize it in
turn, in this case, the MLRO).

4.6. P6: Data can be data for one
observing system and information for
another
Either by choice, or because the data that an observer
attempts to internalize is not relationally connected
with and transformed into information by an
observer, data may remain data for one observing
system and information for another. An example
from the AML case study comes from how staff
demotivation affects SARs submissions. While the
data from the transaction monitoring system ought to
be internalized o ML-analyst so that an evaluation
can take place about suspicious behavior, this does
not always happen due to fatigue, demotivation, and
a ‘pre-judgment’ that the customer would not be a
suspect because the software has such a high false
positive rate (originally > 99%). In this case, the
distinction between information/data may collapse to
a data/data distinction when o ML-analyst, data are
not internalized, however o MLRO, this data is postobserved information and will need to be internalized
so that a final reporting decision can be made. Also,
the exact same data may not be internalized by one
observer but they could be internalized by another.

4.7. P7: Information systems support
themselves by consuming data from
their environment
Within the AML department, members of staff use a
transaction monitoring system that flags and riskscores the suspects based on their transactions (this is
built into the functionality of the software and adjusted
by the bank). While it is beyond the scope of the
present paper to explore how technology shapes the
boundary between information/data, we can think of
technology as a common background against which
data/information distinctions are communicated and
shaped. In this example, o AML department,
information systems emerge by an observer within the
marked space that includes: the AML organizational
structure, the software applications used by the AML
department for supporting its raison d’être and, of
course, the human agents within the department (in
this ML-analysts and the MLRO). This marked space
that we denote as the information system of our
example, is demarcated and distinguished from its data
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environment (e.g. raw transaction data from customers
and data that is filtered down for use from the AML
department by the bank). However, without a data
environment as a ‘source of energy’ to support its
existence and its function of monitoring and reporting
suspicious transactions (despite the many challenges
in the effectiveness and AML compliance perceived as
a cost-center within the bank), such an information
system would not have been able to maintain itself.
The information system is not only supporting itself by
consuming data from its environment. It is structurally
coupled with its environment; as we’ve noted, the
environment is not a residual category but constitutive
of the information system’s existence [16].

5. Conclusion
While the nature of data and information is
challenging, we argue in this essay that the best way to
reflect on them is by exploring them relationally and
by including the central role of the observing systems
in shaping the distinction between them. To the degree
that IS upholds the relevance of human agency (even
when that becomes restricted and confined [6]), and
to the degree that we’re talking about socio-technical
systems, we believe that systems theory can yield
considerable insights [5]. Within systems theory,
second-order cybernetics that switches the emphasis
from observed systems to observing systems [10] can
provide a very rich theoretical platform upon which
our field can rest for exploring its foundational
concepts.
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